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Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law:
Berle’s Vision of Limits on Corporate Power
Elizabeth Pollman*
INTRODUCTION
This Berle X Symposium essay gives prominence to distinguished
corporate law scholar Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and his key writings of the 1950s
and 1960s. Berle is most famous for his work decades earlier, in the 1930s,
with Gardiner Means on the topic of the separation of ownership and
control,1 and for his great debate of corporate social responsibility with E.
Merrick Dodd.2 Yet the world was inching closer to our contemporary one
in terms of both business and technology in Berle’s later years and his
work from this period deserves attention.
For corporate law scholars who set their sights facing ahead rather
than behind, this mid-twentieth century period of business law literature
may appear as a blank space in the annals of scholarly inquiry into
corporations. Perhaps the best-known description of this time comes from
Yale law professor Bayless Manning who wrote in 1962 that “corporation
law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States.”3
According to Manning:

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Many thanks to Charles O’Kelley, the Adolf
A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society, Seattle University School of Law, and
symposium participants.
1. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION &
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2. Compare A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932), and A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932). For discussion of the Berle–Dodd debate, see William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34
J. CORP. L. 99, 122–35 (2008); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Merrick Dodd and the Great Depression: A
Few Historical Corrections, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 513 (2019).
3. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
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When American law ceased to take the ‘corporation’ seriously, the
entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct
slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but our great
empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers of rusted girders,
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.4

Although traditional corporate law may have quieted to an empty city
blown by winds, Berle’s work during this mid-twentieth century period
reflects a lively intellectual effort to describe and predict a new path of
laws affecting business corporations. By the early 1950s, Berle had
rejoined academic life after years in government service, including a stint
as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil.5 When he returned to scholarly writing,
Berle resumed exploring the concentration of power that corporations
represented in U.S. society, and did so in the post-Depression era with
particular sensitivity to the potential for expanding legal liabilities and
responsibilities.6
In a series of publications, Berle repeatedly highlighted the problem
of economic power in corporations. He wrote about the issue as one of
“bigness” as an absolute matter and as relative to particular industries in
terms of concentration.7 In a 1958 article, he noted: “Practically all of
American industry is now held in corporate form. Probably two-thirds of
it is held or operated by not more than 600 large corporations.”8 Following
4. Id.; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 10, 155 (1970) (discussing Manning’s perspective
and noting that “Manning struck his appraisal in the 1960’s, after a generation’s stable acceptance of
the enabling-act type of corporation law, which emerged as a national norm out of developments at
the turn of the century”); Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 305, 305 (2013) (explaining “the distinctive features of corporate law in the ‘long 1950s,’ why the
field appeared vibrant at the time, and how later changes in the American political economy led most
to eventually agree with Manning’s diagnosis”).
5. Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Braintruster as an Intellectual
Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663 (2019).
6. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 433 (1962) [hereinafter Berle, Modern Functions] (discussing how later generations discussed
his work as “folklore” but he had lived through the early twentieth century, “a corporate and financial
world without the safeguards of the Securities and Exchange Commission, without systemization and
forced publicity of corporate accounting, without (more or less) consistent application of antitrust
laws, without discouragement of financial pyramiding”).
7. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 4, 4 (1960)
[hereinafter Berle, Economic Power]. For a contrasting view of bigness as unavoidable, with the “real
problem” as making sure that “it be possible for small enterprises to exist side by side with the giants,”
see PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER 342–44
(Transaction Publishers 1993) (1950).
8. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958)
[hereinafter Berle, Control]; see also Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 6, at 434 (“Within the
industrial sphere the degree of concentration has remained about the same. But the aggregate of
THE

2019]

Quasi Governments and Inchoate Law

619

this assertion, he conceded, “history seems to have vindicated” the late
Professor E. Merrick Dodd that “directors, or ‘management,’ of any of
these corporations are no longer merely stewards . . . for their
stockholders.”9 Large corporations had “outgrown the ‘incorporated
partnership’ phase” of business history and Berle concluded that the
directors of these large corporations “are also stewards for the employed
personnel, for customers and suppliers, and indeed for that section of the
community affected by their operations.”10 The community had grown to
expect that goods and services would be supplied at an “acceptable” price,
that employment opportunities would be provided, and that industries
would keep pace with technological progress.11 In Berle’s eyes, “the huge
modern corporation fit[] awkwardly” with free market economic theory.12
At the forefront of his 1950s and 1960s writings were two additional
concepts describing mechanisms by which the law could control
corporations and reign in their encroachments on individual liberty. The
first was the notion of corporations as quasi governments, subject to the
application of constitutional principles as state actors.13 The second was
the idea of “inchoate law,” a term coined in a seminar at Columbia Law
School to describe how the community “moves into action, either through
the courts or through the legislature, or through some other form of
political intervention” when corporations do not fulfill their expected
social roles.14
Both concepts are worthy of excavation. From a twenty-first century
perspective, the first concept, of corporations as quasi governments,
represents a path largely untaken, a prophecy unfulfilled as of yet. It puts
into sharp relief the vast expansion of corporate rights rather than
responsibilities that developed since the 1970s, and it offers a potential
logic, albeit a problematic one, for subjecting corporations to additional
limits or preventing the further expansion of corporate rights.
industry, both in size and in relative importance, has established undoubted dominance. Concentration
within it is thus markedly more powerful relative to total production and in the total economic sense
today than it was in 1932.”).
9. Berle, Control, supra note 8, at 1212.
10. Id. As a corollary, Berle suggested that the holders of corporate control had certain
responsibilities as well. Id. at 1215 (“[Control] is essentially a variety of political process—non-statist
and therefore, in our vocabulary, ‘private,’ but with substantial public responsibilities. The holder of
control is not so much the owner of a proprietary right as the occupier of a power-position.”).
11. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 7.
12. Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 6, at 436.
13. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 948–53 (1952)
[hereinafter Berle, Constitutional Limitations].
14. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 7–8.
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The second concept, of corporations subject to “inchoate law” that
waits ready to spring into action when corporations fail to self-regulate
their impacts on citizens, represents a largely forgotten predecessor of
subsequent writings by other business law scholars on corporate law
federalism,15 “bubble laws,”16 “quack corporate governance,”17 and
“publicness.”18 Berle’s concept of inchoate law might be fruitfully
connected to this significant scholarly work. Further, the concept of
inchoate law provides a lens for understanding calls from the business
community to embrace social responsibility that have followed in recent
decades.
This essay proceeds by engaging each concept in turn and showing
its relevance for contemporary issues. First, I observe that Berle’s
prediction about corporations as quasi governments, subject to
constitutional constraints, has largely failed to materialize. The immense
power wielded by twenty-first century media and technology giants, such
15. See, e.g., John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND.
L.J. 1345 (2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG.,
Spring 2003, at 26; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The
Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006); Renee
M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation, and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN.
INS. L.J. 107 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does
The Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk
Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC
at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws,
40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Charles K.
Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An
Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale & Robert B.
Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
487 (2015); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. Sale,
The New “Public” Corporation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137; Cary Martin Shelby,
Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV.
405 (2016).
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as Facebook and Twitter, has raised the issue anew but with challenges
and complexities to applying the First Amendment that even Berle might
find troubling. The concept of corporations as quasi governments is
perhaps better regarded as a counterpoint to advocacy for greater
expansions of corporate rights, reminding modern thinkers that it is
possible to regard corporations not only as private right bearers but also as
public actors. Second, I uncover insights from Berle’s writings on inchoate
law and connect them to current literature, showing that they offer a
historical foundation for recent calls for corporations to embrace a more
capacious view of their responsibilities.
I. CORPORATIONS AS QUASI GOVERNMENTS
Berle engaged in the dangerous practice of making predictions. He
vigorously defended this practice without apology, noting he believed that
as lawyers and legal scholars “we would be very remiss if we did not”
predict the direction of the law and he accepted that some of his predictions
might prove to be wrong.19
In some respects, ranging from his musings on the pervasive cultural
“impact of a new gadget called ‘TV’”20 to his intuition that American law
was on a path toward responding to “the problem of discrimination on the
ground of race or religion,”21 Berle seems prescient in hindsight or at least
an astute observer of cultural shifts at the time.
Yet, the law has also developed quite contrary to his predictions.
Chief among those that have proven wrong is his prediction that courts
would impose constitutional limits on corporations and their activities. In
the years following Berle’s prediction, corporations have instead used
court battles to vastly expand their own rights.
This Part examines Berle’s writings on quasi governments in light of
subsequent legal developments and evaluates their potential utility in
current debates.

19. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 22 (“If we do not [predict what the law will be], I
myself think we ought to go out of business and I ought to try to get a job at—well, maybe, the RAND
Corporation in California, where I can shove things into a machine and go to sleep happily while an
IBM pulls out the answer at the end. In other words, I wouldn’t need to be a lawyer. I am prepared to
defend that against all comers.”).
20. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 BUS. LAW. 149, 156
(1968) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Decision-Making].
21. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
639, 659 (1952) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate Concentration].
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A. Berle’s Prediction of Constitutional Limits on Corporate Action
Inspired by cases that were relatively recent at the time, Berle
predicted a different world than the one we inherited. Berle saw the
beginning of a possible trend in Shelley v. Kraemer,22 and Marsh v.
Alabama,23 in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce racially
discriminatory covenants on property transfer and applied constitutional
principles to a company town owned and operated by a corporation. As a
matter of longstanding principle, for the Constitution to apply there must
be state action.24 Rarely does a private actor rise to that level—but where
others saw limits, Berle saw possibility.
Starting from historical precedent, Berle observed that in early
English law corporations were “in form, in fact, and in legal cognizance a
device by which the political state got something done.”25 In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in England and in the U.S.,
corporations resembled “public authorities”: “A ferry had to be run; a
harbor needed wharves; a colony needed to be developed; a particular line
of industry needed encouragement.”26
During this period, corporations were regarded as “an agency of the
state,” including “when, in 1787, the United States drafted its
Constitution.”27 Berle pointed to Madison’s notes from the Constitutional
Convention, suggesting that the delegates did not support giving the
federal government power to charter corporations because they were
“commonly regarded as state monopolies” and “a powerful agency by
which the nascent Federal Government might enter, affect, perhaps even
control and dominate the commercial field.”28 Later, in McCulloch v.
Maryland,29 the Supreme Court held that Congress has power to charter
corporations, Berle observed, “but always with the underlying limitation
22. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
state courts from enforcing racially discriminatory covenants prohibiting transfer of real property);
Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 949–50.
23. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (“Whether a corporation or a municipality owns
or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free.”); Berle, Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 13, at 953.
24. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). For discussions of the state action doctrine,
see LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? A
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS WITH PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS (1988); G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual
History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
333 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985).
25. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 944.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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that a federal charter may be granted as a means of performing some
function or exercising some power delegated to the United States.”30
State-chartered corporations likewise “were agencies of the
chartering state,” and understood as such, according to Berle, until the
latter part of the nineteenth century by which time states had adopted
general corporation laws.31 The “underlying premise” still remained that
chartering corporations was “a state act designed to further a state purpose,
namely the encouragement of trade and commerce,” but corporations were
also by then “regarded as a private institution.”32 The corporate form “had
virtually become a mere method of business organization” and “[t]he
operations of the small shop, or of the small factory, did not attain a powerposition capable of invading personality save in rare instances, and these
were chiefly in the field of railroads and public utilities.”33
Courts dealt with the concentrated power of railroads as a matter of
classic public utility regulation or as regulation of interstate commerce
under the commerce clause, including in cases involving racial
discrimination.34 In 1903, Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act
to make it unlawful for any carrier to subject any person to undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.35 Although Congress may have
aimed at issues concerning rebates and preferential rates and services, the
Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. United States, held the Interstate Commerce
Act gave all travelers the right to equal treatment, but did not address the
question of segregation.36 At the time of Berle’s writing in 1952, he noted
that “legal controversy as to what is ‘equal treatment’ required to be
afforded individuals by common carrier regulations is still going on.”37
Berle saw in this legal development the seed of a larger change; in
his words, “a quiet translation of constitutional law from the field of
political to the field of economic rights.”38 He observed that an effect of
Mitchell v. United States was to subject corporate policies and practices to
legal limits, allowing such policies and practices so long as they were
30. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 945.
31. Id. at 946.
32. Id.; see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343,
344 (1947) (“The legal doctrine of corporate personality was built around the idea of a sovereign grant
of certain attributes of personality to a definable group, engaged in an enterprise.”).
33. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 946.
34. Id. at 947 (discussing Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), and Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio
R.R., 218 U.S. 71 (1910)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (discussing Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941)).
37. Id. For a discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its aftermath,
see MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE (2010).
38. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 942.
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“reasonable” and did not “burden interstate commerce.”39 And, “[i]n
practice, there is little real difference between this criterion of
‘reasonableness’ and the criterion of ‘equal protection of the laws’ applied
to state action.”40
Furthermore, Berle looked to Marsh v. Alabama involving the direct
application of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to
corporate action and practices.41 In Marsh, a sheriff’s deputy of a company
town, paid by the corporation, arrested a Jehovah’s Witness for
distributing religious literature on its streets as trespass on private
property.42 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for trespass,
holding that although the company town was owned and operated by a
private corporation, it was performing a “public function” and therefore
subject to constitutional limitations.43 The Court noted that “the
corporation can no more deprive people of freedom of press and religion
than it can discriminate against commerce.”44
Shelley v. Kraemer provided further evidence to Berle of shifting
tides in state action doctrine.45 In Shelley, the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state court from enforcing a racially
discriminatory covenant on transferring real property.46 The covenant was
a private contractual term; enforcement of it invoked state power.
Beyond explaining this line of logic and authority, Berle was
stepping into the realm of prediction making.47 He recognized that “[t]he
case remains open, so far as authority is concerned, where the corporation
is able to enforce its rule, or carry out its practice, without calling on the
state to assist in its enforcement.”48 The open question had enormous
implications, as Berle recognized, because “most corporate practices and

39. Id. at 948.
40. Id. Berle further observed that the rule did not seem limited to public utilities. Id. (“A rule or
practice, for example, imposed by an oil company, a chain of gasoline stations or even chain stores,
could conceivably burden interstate commerce quite as much as any regulation of a railroad.”).
41. Id.
42. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1946).
43. Id. at 506–07.
44. Id. at 507 n.4.
45. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 949–50.
46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
47. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 950 (“There is a gap in direct application
of constitutional rules to corporate action which the courts have not yet bridged.”); see also Berle,
Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 658 (“Taking the two lines of argument—that flowing
from Shelley v. Kraemer and that flowing from Marsh v. Alabama, the conclusion seems reasonably
predictable.”).
48. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 950.
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regulations are directly applied” without invoking state enforcement
power.49
The key to understanding how the law would develop, in Berle’s
view, was to recognize that the economic power concentrated in
corporations, in combination with their state-granted charters, had public
implications and the potential to impinge on individual liberties. First,
states chartered corporations. The same residual power kept by states that
could “justify the right of a legislature to change or modify stockholders’
rights” implied that the state expected that “the corporation will not
exercise its power . . . in a manner forbidden the state itself.”50 Second,
corporations would not be subject to constitutional tests “merely” because
they operated with state-granted charters.51 There would be no wrong,
according to Berle, without “very considerable concentration of economic
power in a given area.”52 That type of concentration meant that individuals
had “either no choice or a very limited choice of suppliers of such goods
or services.”53 Once a corporation wielded that level of actual power, its
policies and practices were effectively “public” rules.54
In sum, Berle predicted that courts would apply constitutional
provisions to corporations as limits on their activities when these two
preconditions were met: “the undeniable fact that the corporation was
created by the state and the existence of sufficient economic power
concentrated in this vehicle to invade the constitutional right of an
individual to a material degree.”55 Berle expected the most likely
circumstance in which courts would apply constitutional limits would be
where a large corporation with concentrated economic power had
discriminated against consumers of its goods and services.56 He wrote:

49. Id.
50. Id. at 952.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 951.
53. Id. at 952.
54. Id. at 953; see also Berle, Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 643 (“[T]he great
corporation, as monopoly or in a concentrate, has become increasingly an arm of the state, held to
certain of the limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring the concentrate to
respect certain individual rights and to assure a measure of equal protection of the laws within the
scope of its power, as well as to fulfill the economic function it has undertaken of production, supply
and service.”).
55. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 943. Berle gave credit to other thinkers
around this time, such as Professor Arthur Miller who had suggested similar ideas. Berle, Economic
Power, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that in PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1959),
Arthur Miller had suggested that corporations are “public organisms” and that courts could “apply
fundamental limitations of due process of law to the use of any ‘governing power’”).
56. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 954.
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If, for instance, a corporation dealing in goods or services essential
to the life of an individual discriminates against a customer on the
ground of race or in a matter which invades his Constitutional right
of freedom of speech or religion, it would seem that there is a
violation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.57

Perhaps less likely, in his view, would be application of
constitutional provisions when a corporation had discriminated in its
provision of access to business opportunity.58 He gave as an example that
large corporations such as General Motors and Standard Oil were in a
position to potentially discriminate in “the whole complicated gamut of
operation from distribution back to production.”59 From decisions about
sales agreements to the distribution of products necessary for small
businesses to render their services, Berle saw in these relationships the
potential for discrimination and encroachment on individual liberty.60
B. An Era of Statutory Anti-Discrimination Laws
Berle’s mid-twentieth century work implicated a broader question:
Should we protect the individual by judicial application of constitutional
provisions to corporations or by legislation? Professor Herbert Wechsler,
in his 1959 Holmes lecture at Harvard Law School, made a prediction that
has hit closer to subsequent legal developments:
Many understandably would like to perceive in the primary and
covenant decisions a principle susceptible of broad extension,
applying to the other power aggregates in our society limitations of
the kind the Constitution has imposed on government. My colleague
A. A. Berle, Jr., has, indeed, pointed to the large business corporation,
which after all is chartered by the state and wields in many areas more
power than the government, as uniquely suitable for choice as the
next subject of such application. I doubt that the courts will yield to
such temptations; and I do not hesitate to say that I prefer to see the
issues faced through legislation, where there is room for drawing
lines that courts are not equipped to draw. If this is right the two
decisions I have mentioned will remain, as they now are, ad hoc
determinations of their narrow problems, yielding no neutral
principles for their extension or support.61

57. Berle, Corporate Concentration, supra note 21, at 658.
58. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 954.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
31 (1959).
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As Professor Wechsler suggested, instead of expanding Marsh v.
Alabama and Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court has narrowed their
reach, although not explicitly overruling them.62 The Court has heard
several dozen “state action” cases, defining the scope of the Constitution’s
application on a case-by-case basis, establishing several lines of cases with
limited breadth and blurry edges about when a private individual or entity
is deemed a state actor.63 Observers have characterized the case law as a
“doctrinal briar patch”;64 the Court itself has referred to the state action
doctrine as “difficult terrain.”65 Through all of this, the Court has not
broadly interpreted large corporations with economic power as state actors
subject to constitutional provisions, as Berle predicted. In fact, the Court
has never again ruled as it did in Marsh that the Constitution required large
corporations as such to respect individual civil liberties.66
Near the end of Berle’s life, he witnessed the development of antidiscrimination laws that came about through the legislative process.67
Most notably, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for the equal
enjoyment of any place of public accommodation without discrimination
and prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, national
origin, religion, or sex.68 When a business challenged the constitutionality
of the public accommodations provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court
62. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928, 937, 939 n.21 (1982) (recognizing that
“the party charged with the deprivation [of a federal right] must be a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor” and rejecting the notion “that a private party’s mere invocation of state legal
procedures” satisfies the state-actor requirement (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see
also King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 671 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (recognizing that “the United States
Supreme Court has . . . pulled back the reach of Shelley, if not overruling it sub silentio, by requiring
‘something more’ than the reliance on a . . . judicial proceeding” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For further discussion of the state action doctrine in the mid-twentieth century, see SOPHIA Z. LEE,
THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 88–92, 143–47, 149–52,
194–97 (2014).
63. John Dorsett Niles et al., Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 886–
87 (2011).
64. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 302 (1995).
65. Id.; Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995); see also Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding
when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency.”).
66. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL
RIGHTS 271 (2018); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment
by government, federal or state . . . . This elementary proposition is little more than a truism. But even
truisms are not always unexceptionably true, and an exception to this one was recognized almost 30
years ago in Marsh v. Alabama . . . .”).
67. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–11
(1965) [hereinafter Berle, Property, Production and Revolution] (discussing the Civil Rights Act).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (2012).
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swiftly rejected the claims of the business and sustained the Act’s
validity.69 Berle pointed out that the “old concept of ‘public utilities’”
could have supported the accommodations provision of the Act, but that
Congress had instead used the rationale of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment.70 He seemed to view this development as
generally affirming his earlier intuitions about the direction of the law.71
Moreover, he did not give up on his prediction, noting that “[t]he passage
of the Civil Rights Act does not, of course prevent the application of
constitutional limitations along the lines suggested in my article . . . .”72
In subsequent years, Congress enacted additional statutes, including:
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which prohibits
discrimination against employees 40 years and older;73 Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, commonly referred to as the Fair
Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and
financing of dwellings, based on race, national origin, religion, sex,
familial status, and disability;74 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
disabilities and requires that employers reasonably accommodate
individuals with disabilities who can otherwise perform a job, among other
protections.75
These statutes create a patchwork of anti-discrimination laws that can
apply to corporations as employers, public accommodations, landlords,
and more, but do not specifically target corporations or concentrated
economic power as such.76 The large body of statutory anti-discrimination
laws do not fully parallel constitutional restraints on governments, but they

69. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964).
70. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, supra note 67, at 11 n.32.
71. Indeed, in the early 1950s Berle predicted not only the application of constitutional
limitations to corporations but also the development of statutory law. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 106 (1954) [hereinafter BERLE, 20TH CENTURY] (“[T]he long
evolution of constitutional law through court decision . . . will probably cover the territory in fulness
of time. But test cases are difficult and expensive, and while they are being awaited and carried
forward, thousands of individuals may suffer bitterly. Some sort of modern civil rights act . . . seems
clearly indicated.”).
72. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, supra note 67, at 19 n.47 (“This could, as I think
it does, include recognition that collective operations—predominantly conducted by corporations—as
they attain size and power, are assimilable to statist operations, and are governed by the same
constitutional limitations.”).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
76. For an overview of anti-discrimination laws, see ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES (2011).
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have established a reach that case-by-case determinations in state action
doctrine have not achieved.77
C. Corporations as Quasi Governments Redux
One longstanding obstacle to applying constitutional principles to
corporations has been the complicated task of drawing lines between when
private entities constitute state actors and when they do not. Notably,
Berle’s own writings were short on details in this regard. He does not
explain when there would be “sufficient economic power” to find that a
corporation encroached on an individual’s constitutional right to “a
material degree,” such that the corporation should be deemed a state
actor.78
Contemporary debates have raised anew the issue of applying
constitutional provisions to corporations and have surfaced additional
concerns. One of the most salient of these modern debates is about the role
and regulation of social media and other major digital platforms and
technology corporations, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google.
The dominance of these companies’ products and services and the
stretch of their influence is nearly irrefutable. In a remark echoing Berle’s
writings, Facebook CEO-founder, Mark Zuckerberg, admitted: “In a lot of
ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. We
have this large community of people, and more than other technology
companies we’re really setting policies.”79 According to one measure,
“[s]ixty-two percent of Americans get their news through social media,
and most of it via Facebook; a third of all traffic to media sites flows from
Google.”80 Americans not only consume news, but also post vast amounts
of their own content online. As of 2018, about a quarter of U.S. adults
report that they are Twitter users.81 Two-thirds of U.S. adults report that
they are Facebook users, with about three-quarters of those users accessing

77. For a discussion of the “gap between the constitutional restraints on governments and the
limitations imposed on corporations by statute,” see Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations and
Social Responsibility in Search of the Corporate Soul, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 709, 732–33 (1974).
78. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 943.
79. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT
IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2010).
80. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 6
(2017).
81. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN 2018, at 2 (Mar. 1, 2018), http://assets.
pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2018/03/01105133/PI_2018.03.01_Social-Media_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q92B-ZEXJ].
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the site on a daily basis.82 Nearly three-quarters of U.S. adults use the
video-sharing site YouTube, owned by Google’s parent company.83
Some courts and scholars have begun to consider whether these
companies are providing today’s versions of town halls and public squares,
and accordingly whether the First Amendment should apply to them.84
Issues concerning access to speak and listen through these technologies,
and due process in imposing any restrictions to these benefits are at stake.85
Other commentators have raised an interesting concern about
applying the First Amendment in this context: the corporations are serving
a useful social role in content moderation.86 If the companies providing
online platforms were deemed state actors, the First Amendment would
constrict their practices of curating content, enforcing online community
norms, removing obscene and violent content, and regulating hate speech,
bullying, and terrorism.87 In short, to take away the ability of online
platforms to moderate content would “likely create an internet nobody
wants.”88 Furthermore, some commentators and policymakers have
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (striking down a state
statute banning registered sex offenders from online platforms and describing such social media
services as a “modern public square”); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602, 1609–11 (2018) (discussing how
“courts have struggled with how to conceptualize online platforms within First Amendment doctrine:
as state actors, as broadcasters, or as editors”). For an examination of modern workplaces as “private
governments” and a proposal for a “workplace constitution” that would “incorporate basic
constitutional rights, akin to a bill of rights against employers,” see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 41, 68
(2017).
85. See Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter Be Regulated Under the First
Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/should-facebook-and-twitter-beregulated-under-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/5Q2S-NGL9].
86. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 84, at 1658–59 (arguing that finding online platforms to be
state actors subject to the First Amendment would be “a result that is both unlikely and normatively
undesirable”).
87. See id. at 1659; Farhad Manjoo, Can Washington Stop Big Tech Companies? Don’t Bet on
It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulating-techcompanies.html (noting the largest technology companies are “being called upon to police free speech,
terrorism and sex trafficking, and to defend nations and individuals against existential digital attack”);
Thomas Wheatley, Why Social Media Is Not a Public Forum, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2017/08/04/why-social-media-isnot-a-public-forum [https://perma.cc/XMZ8-U9GP] (“Facebook’s own terms of use and Community
Standards would violate the First Amendment.”).
88. Klonick, supra note 84, at 1659; see also HEATHER WHITNEY, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INST., SEARCH ENGINES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE EDITORIAL ANALOGY 29 (2018) https://
knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Heather_Whitney_Search_Engines_Editorial_Analogy
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVW5-7VYN] (“Users expect a level of content moderation that would likely
be unachievable by a platform constrained by the First Amendment . . . . If the First Amendment rights
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pushed for these corporations to take an even more active role, taking
responsibility for the content they distribute in order to combat the
proliferation of “fake news” and propagandistic speech and advertising.89
In some regards, this discourse echoes Berle’s suggestion that society
had shifted from a dyadic model consisting of the state and the individual
to a pluralist model mediated by other actors.90 But it also highlights the
complexity of conceptualizing private companies that provide online
infrastructure and sites for public discourse in a digital world.91 There are
concerns that Berle did not foresee about applying constitutional
limitations to corporate actors, even those that wield significant power
over individuals. And there is the possibility of reorienting understandings
of the First Amendment itself in a world that has seen significant changes
in communications technologies.92 Berle’s ideas of corporations as quasi
governments, along with other thinkers of his time, provided the beginning
to a story that is not yet finished.
D. The Expansion of Corporate Rights
Finally, in closing this examination of Berle’s concept of quasi
governments and subsequent legal history, one additional development
must be noted—the vast expansion of corporate rights that began in the
1970s. Just as Berle’s great body of work was reaching its conclusion, a
new chapter regarding corporations and the Constitution was beginning.
This, too, is a part of the unfinished story. Instead of the Constitution

of users were deployed to overturn content moderation as we know it, I suspect these platforms would
witness a mass exodus.”).
89. For discussion of congressional hearings and the efforts of technology companies to combat
the spread of disinformation, see Whitney, supra note 88, at 2–3; Mike Isaac, Facebook Mounts Effort
to Limit Tide of Fake News, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/
technology/facebook-fake-news.html; Nick Wingfield et al., Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake
News Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/
google-will-ban-websites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html; Transcript of Mark
Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing/?utm_term=.1c6f566062cf.
90. For a discussion of this point in the contemporary First Amendment context, see Jack M.
Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School
Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153–54 (2018).
91. See id. at 1194 (“Arguing that infrastructure owners are state actors simply replicates the
outmoded assumptions of a pre-digital world.”).
92. See generally TIM WU, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
OBSOLETE? (2017) https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%
20Tim%20Wu%20Is%20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6247T8N9] (discussing major technological and economic developments that have transformed the
conditions of speech, including making speech plentiful and listener attention valuable).
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providing a check on corporate power, as Berle predicted, it became a
source of additional freedoms from regulation for corporations.
The Supreme Court had recognized corporations as having rights
under the Constitution since the early nineteenth century—the concept
was certainly not new at the time of Berle’s writings.93 Until the twentieth
century, however, the Court had maintained a well-established distinction
between property rights that corporations could enjoy and liberty rights
that they could not.94 A Supreme Court decision in the 1930s abandoned
this distinction in a case involving newspaper corporations and the
freedom of the press,95 but it was not until the 1970s that corporations
began to turn to the First Amendment as a source of political power and as
a shield against regulation that protected the interests of workers,
consumers, and the environment.96
Famously, before he was nominated to serve on the Supreme Court
in 1971, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote a memorandum for the Chamber of
Commerce titled Attack on American Free Enterprise System, which
outlined avenues for business to become more politically engaged to fight
the growing regulation of business practices.97 Powell identified the courts
as an essential part of the strategy: “Under our constitutional system,
especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be
the most important instrument for social, economic and political
change.”98 The Powell memorandum was just one effort among many that
spurred the business community to push for greater rights and influence.99
The 1970s saw the rise of business lobbying, and in a series of
landmark decisions the Court laid out the groundwork for corporate
commercial speech protection and political spending rights under the First
93. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1680–89 (2015).
94. Id. at 1695–96, 1724; see also WINKLER, supra note 66, at 234.
95. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
96. Blair & Pollman, supra note 93, at 1719 (“With limited exception, the question of whether
the First Amendment protects corporate commercial speech and political spending did not arise until
the 1970s.”); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223–24 (2015) (finding that “corporations have increasingly
displaced individuals as direct beneficiaries of the First Amendment rights, they have done so recently,
but with growing speed” since the 1970s).
97. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm.,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/
PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf [https://perma.cc/723A-RL83]; see also BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE,
THE LAND OF ENTERPRISE 189–90 (2017); WINKLER, supra note 66, at 280–89.
98. WINKLER, supra note 66, at 289 (quoting the Powell memorandum).
99. See id. at 303 (“Powell’s memo triggered a complete overhaul of the Chamber’s approach to
politics—and, more broadly, ushered in a new era in which business lobbyists would come to dominate
lawmaking in Washington.”).
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Amendment.100 These cases culminated in the controversial 2010 decision
Citizens United v. FEC, which recognized First Amendment protection for
all corporations to make independent political expenditures.101 One
scholar’s recent historical empirical analysis found that “after the burst of
judicial activism under the influence of Justice Powell in the mid-1970s,
First Amendment cases in which businesses are the primary beneficiary
have increasingly displaced cases in which individuals are the primary
beneficiary.”102
Businesses have also increasingly pushed for religious liberty rights
in recent years.103 Most notably, in a 2014 case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., the Court held that for-profit corporations qualify as “persons”
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and are eligible to claim
religious exemptions from general laws such as the Affordable Care Act,
which requires employers to provide certain health care coverage to
employees.104 Further, in 2018, the Supreme Court heard Masterpiece
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, involving a business
owner who refused to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple and
claimed an exemption from state public accommodations law on free
exercise and free speech grounds.105 The Court held that the state civil

100. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571–72
(1980) (holding that a state could not completely ban promotional advertising by an electrical utility);
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a state law
that barred banks and corporations from spending money to influence ballot initiatives); Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976) (ruling that
commercial speech is within the scope of First Amendment protection). For a history of the rise of
business lobbying in the twentieth century, see generally LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA
IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE
(2015).
101. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010). For a legal and historical critique of
Citizens United, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of
Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877 (2016). See
also Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and
Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347
(1979) (discussing an important precedent to Citizens United).
102. Coates, supra note 96, at 262.
103. See THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016);
Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 180–86 (2014); James D. Nelson,
Corporate Disestablishment, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); see also Ronald J. Colombo, The
Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2013); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby,
Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014).
104. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014).
105. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724–26
(2018).
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rights commission had violated the business owner’s free exercise rights
by failing to consider his claim in a neutral and respectful way.106
Setting these legal developments alongside Berle’s prediction of the
Constitution serving as a limit on corporate power shows how far he
missed the mark in his forecast. Perhaps as judicial dissents can plant a
seed for a future majority opinion, Berle’s concept of corporations as quasi
governments could serve as a counterpoint to conceptions that too easily
equate corporations with associations of individuals and rationalize further
expansions of corporate rights.107 As this story continues, Berle’s other
concept from the 1950s and 1960s—of inchoate law—proves to be a more
enduring force.
II. CORPORATIONS AS SUBJECTS OF INCHOATE LAW
During the same era that Berle was exploring the idea of corporations
as quasi governments, he was mapping an understanding of the laws
affecting corporations. This Part connects his writings on this topic to
contemporary scholarship and calls for increased social responsibility.
A. Berle’s Inchoate Law and Echoes in the Literature
Berle asserted that the laws affecting corporations fall into two
categories. The first category encompasses “the explicit rules laid down
by decision or statute and setting out the existing legal capacities and
liabilities.”108 This category exists without dispute as it encompasses laws
that are explicitly established on the books. The second, a “more important
and more difficult category,” Berle referred to as “inchoate law.”109 In his
words, this latter category “relates to the duties of corporations, not set out
either in decision or statute, but arising from the impact on social and
economic situations foreseeably resulting from a corporate course of
action.”110
He envisioned a mechanism of legal pushback that arises to limit the
sphere of corporate action or to establish liability when corporations fail
to self-regulate within expected social norms of responsibility. According
to Berle, “When the impact point is reached, it is predictable that a hitherto
undetermined liability or responsibility will suddenly emerge as explicit

106. Id. at 1732.
107. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence has relied on a
rationale that corporations represent associations of people, see Blair & Pollman, supra note 93.
108. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making, supra note 20, at 149.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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law.”111 He did not provide a fully fleshed out theory but articulated that
new law spurred by the social and economic impact of corporations “might
come about through sudden demand for and passage of legislation—or
through decisions of administrative authorities breaking new ground—or
through court-decision extending judicial action beyond previous limit.”112
In latent form, this law is inchoate: a mere potential, but perceivable
nonetheless.113
Berle provided diverse illustrations. For example, he recounted a
“public clamor” that resulted when it came to light just before World War
II that the head of one of the large oil corporations may have authorized
the sale of petroleum through a neutral country to Nazi Germany.114 After
significant public outcry, the corporation fired the corporate executive.115
Contrasting instances like this one in which the corporation took selfcorrecting action, Berle discussed situations in which corporations that
failed to do so became subject to government intervention.116 The steel
industry incurred a “political intervention on a massive and rather
disorderly scale” after World War II when companies underestimated steel
needs and dismantled facilities financed by the government, causing steel
shortages.117 Congress commenced investigations, the Department of
Justice sprang into action, and a statistician from the Department of
Agriculture provided an independent estimate of the country’s steel
demand.118 In his inaugural address, President Harry Truman stated that
the government would step in to produce steel if needed.119 These
responses elicited a pledge by the steel industry to promptly increase
productive capacity, and Congress passed the Voluntary Allocation Act,
“an extremely crude system of temporary industrial planning,” to work out
the allocation of products in short supply under government supervision.120
111. Id. For an examination of how regulators can act by threat without making hard law, see
Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011).
112. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making, supra note 20, at 149.
113. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 71, at 69 (describing “inchoate” as “there, but not
explicit, to be apprehended and worked out as you went along”).
114. Id. at 54.
115. Id. For an examination of the use of shaming by private parties in the corporate context, see
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
116. Berle, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 13, at 934 (“[T]he evolution of law has been
largely unsystematic. It has grown out of a series of major or minor crises, all of which have a common
element. In each case the industry concerned failed to meet some widespread demand in some quarter
of the community with which it dealt. This generated political action energizing intervention in one
form or another by the political state.”).
117. Berle, Economic Power, supra note 7, at 8.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Echoes of Berle’s ideas reverberate in the works of modern writers.
From scholars who have theorized the development of state corporate law
in the shadow of federal action121 to those who have examined the laws
that get passed after financial scandals and crises,122 they have observed a
similar push and pull of corporate action and societal reaction. These
scholars have traced the dynamic behind a range of legal developments,
from the political economy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act to the changing nature of corporate governance
provisions in securities regulation.
One growing literature with parallels to Berle’s concept of inchoate
law is that of “publicness.”123 Professor Hillary Sale has articulated how
corporate governance transcends a private law sphere and how the public,
government, and media have increasing influence over corporations.124
Like Berle, she has highlighted that corporations that operate in a public
sphere do so “with changing obligations and an evolving, not a fixed,
definition.”125 She uses the term publicness in a way that echoes Berle’s
inchoate law, as both “a process and an outcome” that stem from corporate
failures, and she advances understandings of private ordering as well as
regulation.126 Similarly, Professors Donald Langevoort and Robert
Thompson define publicness generally to refer to “what society demands
of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate.”127 They have argued
that “to a greater extent than generally acknowledged, the broader
demands of publicness drive the creation of contemporary securities
regulation.”128 This growing body of work, as well as various other related
literatures, offers rich accounts and understandings of the relationship
between corporations and regulatory bodies and the public.

121. See supra note 15.
122. See supra notes 16 & 17.
123. See supra note 18.
124. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 18, at 137–38 (“The failure of officers
and directors to govern in a sufficiently public manner has resulted not only in scandals, but also in
more public scrutiny of their decisions, powers, and duties.”).
125. Id. at 138.
126. Sale, Public Governance, supra note 18, at 1012 (“[C]orporate failures expose ‘private’
choices . . . . They reveal the lawmakers’ choices about private ordering and self-regulation. They
highlight the spaces not yet legally defined: those that were omitted. They create pressure for more
reform and public governance.”).
127. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 18, at 340.
128. Id. at 341.
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B. A Description and A Prescription
Despite some fuzziness in its contours, Berle’s concept of inchoate
law was not just descriptive but also prescriptive—he wanted lawyers and
professionals who worked for corporations to monitor the horizon for
coming shifts in the business environment and law and to self-regulate. He
wrote:
It is here suggested that a somewhat similar phenomenon [to a higher
law] is slowly looming up in the corporate field through the mists that
hide from us the history of the next generation. There is beginning to
be apparent a realization of a counter force which checks, and
remotely acts on, and in time may modify in certain areas the absolute
power of business discretion. In our system it emerges in time as law;
and good lawyers watch for it.129

Expectations had changed. In Berle’s youth, corporate counsel were
customarily viewed as “tame lawyers” asked to use their professional
judgment to advise on specific legal problems.130 But by the late 1960s,
Berle explained that these corporate lawyers had an additional role:
“sitting at the right hand of the policy-making officers, they have the
opportunity, if not the duty, to advise upon the possible consequences,
economic, legal and social, of corporate decision-making.”131
Corporate managers also bore social responsibility and were subject
to the vagaries of inchoate law: “The result at all events has been that in a
range of action, where social, political and human problems are pushed
up, corporate managements are frequently the first line point of impact.
They deal with these as best they can; failing, they or others invoke
political or governmental action.”132
Berle’s work provides a lens for understanding calls from the
business community to embrace social responsibility that have followed
in recent years. Although not pervasive, the trend is clear that influential
players are willing to take on a more capacious role with an understanding
of the consequences at stake.133
129. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 71, at 70; see also id. at 107 (“Pending legislation [to
provide due process and protect individuals’ civil rights], it is suggested that corporations themselves
are not wholly without capacity to act. They, in respect of their own operations, can erect their own
Aula Regis, and wisdom would suggest that they do.”).
130. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making, supra note 20, at 149.
131. Id.
132. Berle, Modern Functions, supra note 6, at 444.
133. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making, supra note 20, at 150 (“Whereas a generation ago, the
law was preoccupied with assuring that managements did not victimize their shareholders,
preoccupation today is with the extent of their social and political and economic responsibility for the
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For example, at the start of 2018, the chairperson of BlackRock, the
world’s largest asset manager, sent an open letter to over 1,000 CEOs,
explaining: “Society is demanding that companies, both public and
private, serve a social purpose.”134 He urged the CEOs to “not only deliver
financial performance” but also make “a positive contribution to society”
by leading their corporations to benefit all stakeholders, “including
shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they
operate.”135 The BlackRock chairperson instructed the executives to
“understand the societal impact of [their] business as well as the ways that
broad, structural trends—from slow wage growth to rising automation to
climate change—affect [the] potential for growth.”136
Similarly, in 2017, when President Donald Trump was deciding
whether to pull the United States out of a major international climate
change accord, thirty CEOs signed an open letter championing continued
commitment to the agreement.137 In addition, more than 360 institutional
investors with more than $19 trillion in assets under management signed a
separate letter in support.138 When the U.S. President decided to exit, a
group of mayors, governors, university presidents, and more than 100
businesses, including some of the largest U.S. companies such as Apple,
Exxon Mobil, and Ford Motor Company, negotiated with the United
Nations concerning an independent submission to the climate deal.139
Berle recognized that the dynamic of inchoate law is an imperfect
one. Social and political forces might be slow to commence or extreme in
their result.140 As he explained, “Exact justice cannot be expected in these
situations: someone gets hurt. Yet on the whole community standards for
corporate action gradually do assert themselves, and capable corporations
134. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK, https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/5KAXXYMX].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Andrew Winston, U.S. Business Leaders Want to Stay in the Paris Climate Accord,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 31, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/u-s-business-leaders-want-to-stay-in-theparis-climate-accord.
138. Press Release, Ceres, Nearly 400 Global Investors Urge G20 to Stand by Paris Agreement
and Drive Its Swift Implementation (July 3, 2017), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/pressreleases/over-200-global-investors-urge-g7-stand-paris-agreement-and-drive-its
[https://perma.cc/
BR7W-YFU8].
139. Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States, and Companies
Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/
american-cities-climate-standards.html; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Social and Asocial Enterprise, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey
eds., 2018) (discussing the increasing social and political engagement of business).
140. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 71, at 57.
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reach for them and endeavor to meet them.”141 His insight was in providing
not only an observation about the laws affecting corporations but also a
proposal for action.
CONCLUSION
“I have said more than enough to get into trouble,” Berle remarked
in closing one of his last publications.142 Although his later work is less
famous than his writings from the 1930s, it is full of the kinds of insights
that can provoke, challenge, and indeed perhaps even start a little scholarly
trouble.
This essay has aimed to shine light on Berle’s work from the 1950s
and 1960s, and connect it to contemporary debates. With his concepts of
corporations as quasi governments and subjects of inchoate law, Berle
explored various ways in which society could constrain and ameliorate the
impact of corporate power and ultimately preserve the legitimacy of
corporations—essential work for generations to come.

141. Id. at 57–58.
142. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making, supra note 20, at 157.

